The matter was remanded to the concerned Family Court with directions to proceed with the petition expeditiously in accordance with law. (AI image)

The Delhi High Court has allowed a couple to present a petition for divorce by mutual consent prior to the completion of one year of marriage, stating that compelling parties to continue a relationship that had never been consummated or acted upon would result in “exceptional hardship”. When overturning a Family Court order which had refused such leave, the Court reasoned that the situation warranted the application of the statutory exception in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.The judgment was passed on 20.01.2026, by a division bench of Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Renu Bhatnagar, adjudicating an appeal made under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, read with paired with Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA). The appeal was challenging an order of 9 December 2025 of the Family Court at Saket, which had ordered the rejection of the application of the appellant under Section 14 HMA seeking permission to present a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent divorce before the lapse of one year of the date of marriage and had thus declared the main petition not maintainable.Background of the ProceedingsThe parties got married on 30 March 2025, at Arya Samaj Mandir, Khirki Village, New Delhi and registered their marriage on 2 April 2025 with the office of the District Magistrate, South Delhi. It was an admitted position before the Court that the parties never cohabited even for a single day after the marriage, the marriage was never consummated, and both continued residing at their respective parental homes immediately thereafter.As per record, the parties quickly realized that they had irreconcilable differences and incompatibility and they agreed to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent. Since the petition under Section 13-B (1)-HMA was filed within seven months of the marriage, they filed an accompanying application under Section 14 HMA seeking leave of the Court to present the petition before expiry of one year.Under the impugned order, the Family Court declined leave on the ground that the parties had failed to establish “exceptional hardship”. It also held that sufficient attempts had not been made to save the marriage and that they had registered the marriage soon after the solemnization, and this nullified their case of hardship. The joint divorce petition was thus considered not to be maintainable.Submissions before the CourtCounsel appearing for both parties submitted before the High Court that the respondent husband was presently residing in Canada, while the appellant wife was living in India and was required to care for her aged parents. It was argued that neither party was willing or able to relocate and that these circumstances were beyond their control. The continued separation and lack of any realistic possibility of resuming matrimonial life, it was argued, was an exceptional hardship that justified the statutory waiting period being relaxed.The Court heard counsel and reviewed the record in the context of the statutory framework addressing mutual-consent divorce.Provisions Considered by the CourtThe bench initially referred to Section 13-B (1) HMA that states that a joint mutual consent divorce petition may be presented where the parties have lived separately one year or more, they cannot live together and both are mutually willing to end the marriage. The provision reads:“A petition for dissolution of marriage… may be presented… on the ground that they have been living separately for a period of one year or more… and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.”The Court then examined Section 14 HMA, which imposes a bar on entertaining divorce petitions within one year of marriage, but allows the Court to approve leave earlier in cases of exceptional hardship or depravity. The provision further states that the interest of children and chances of reconciliation before the end of the period of statute should also be taken into consideration.Reliance on Full Bench JudgementThe parties relied on a recent Full Bench decision of the High Court in Shiksha Kumari v. Santosh Kumar, which clarified the legal position on waiver of statutory waiting periods. Summarizing its conclusions, the Full Bench had observed:“The statutory period of 01-year… can be waived… only upon the court being satisfied that circumstances of ‘exceptional hardship’… exist.”The decision also clarified that waiver of one-year separation requirement and waiver of six-month cooling-off are independent grounds and may be given provided that statutory requirements are met.Examination of Facts by the CourtThe Division Bench examined the undisputed factual circumstances using the statutory rules and precedents: the parties had never lived together, the marriage had not been consummated, they had been living separately since the start of the marriage and the parties did not have any children together. The Court found these facts to be undermining the existence of a substantive matrimonial relationship.The judgment recorded:“The admitted facts demonstrate that the parties never cohabited, the marriage was never consummated, and they have lived separately since the very inception of the marriage… [These] strike at the very foundation of a subsisting matrimonial relationship.”Considering the intent of the statutory waiting period, the Court said that by requiring the continuance of a marriage that was created by mere legal form, it would create more hardship and not serve the object of the matrimonial law.It observed:“Insisting upon continuation of a marriage which exists only in law, and not in substance, would amount to compelling the parties to endure a relationship devoid of any matrimonial foundation.”The High Court found the reasoning of the Family Court unsustainable on two counts.First, it held that the inference drawn from registration of marriage was misplaced:“Registration of marriage is merely a statutory mandate, and by itself, cannot be determinative of matrimonial harmony… or the viability of the marital relationship.”Second, it rejected the observation regarding lack of efforts to save the marriage, noting:“Where the marriage has never been acted upon by the parties through cohabitation, the question of saving such a marriage does not meaningfully arise.”Bearing in mind the distance between the parties, the obligations the appellant had to her parents, and the fact the respondent lived in a different country, the Court considered the existence of exceptional hardship and the likelihood of reconciliation. It held that there was no material that suggested any likelihood of revival of matrimonial life.The Bench held:“Insisting upon adherence to the statutory period… would serve no meaningful purpose… and would only result in prolonging a marriage that exists merely in law and not in substance, thereby causing exceptional hardship.”Accordingly, the Court found that the case squarely fell within the exception contemplated under Section 14 HMA.The High Court set aside the order dated 09.12.2025 passed by the Family Court. It allowed the application under Section 14 HMA and granted leave to the parties to present their joint petition for divorce by mutual consent under Section 13-B (1) HMA without waiting for expiry of one year from the date of marriage.The matter was remanded to the concerned Family Court with directions to proceed with the petition expeditiously in accordance with law. The appeal was allowed in these terms.MAT.APP. (F.C.) 443/2025 NUPUR GARGNUPUR GARG vs DWARKESH AHUJFor Appellant: Mr. Abhishek Wadhwa, Mr. Somyaa Gurung & Mr. Saurabh Yadav, Advs. with appellant in person.For Respondent: Mr. Dhiraj Bhiduri, Adv. with respondent present through VC.(Vatsal Chandra is a Delhi-based Advocate practicing before the courts of Delhi NCR.)