Sipu Jha
A routine scientific rocket launch from Norway in January 1995 triggered one of the most serious nuclear alerts of the post Cold War era, as reported by the BBC. For several tense minutes, Russian military systems identified the object as a possible incoming missile. The alert reached the highest level of command. Russian President Boris Yeltsin activated his nuclear briefcase, the first time any world leader is known to have done so in response to a perceived attack. The rocket was not military. It was launched to study the Northern Lights. But confusion inside Russia’s early warning network briefly created the conditions for nuclear retaliation. The episode exposed gaps in communication and lingering mistrust only a few years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
A Norwegian weather rocket was mistaken for a missile
The rocket was launched on 25 January 1995 from the Andøya Rocket Range in northern Norway. It was a Black Brant XII research rocket, part of a programme examining the aurora borealis, sometimes referred to as the Northern Lights. Its flight profile was unusual. The rocket climbed to a high altitude, around 1,450 kilometres, before descending towards the sea near Spitsbergen. On Russian radar, the steep ascent resembled the trajectory of a submarine-launched ballistic missile.In the Norwegian Sea, United States submarines were known to operate. A missile fired from that area could reach Moscow in about 20 minutes. Radar operators in northern Russia saw a fast-rising object and had little context beyond that.
The nuclear briefcase was activated in Russia
The alert moved quickly up the military chain of command. Within minutes, it reached the Kremlin. Yeltsin was informed that an unidentified rocket had been detected and that it might represent the first stage of a nuclear strike designed to disable Russian radar systems.He opened the Cheget nuclear briefcase. The device allows the president to communicate with senior commanders and authorise a retaliatory launch if necessary. Russian military doctrine at the time included the option of launching on warning, meaning a response could be ordered before incoming missiles struck their targets. For a short period, advisers evaluated radar data and flight patterns. There was limited time to decide. The object was still being tracked.
Diplomatic notification that failed to reach the right desks
Norway had informed Moscow in advance about the planned launch. A notice was sent through diplomatic channels in December 1994 to countries in the region. The information, for reasons that remain unclear, did not reach the Russian early warning units responsible for monitoring missile activity. This breakdown proved critical. Without prior knowledge, the radar reading was assessed against worst-case assumptions. The mid-1990s were a period of political strain inside Russia. Confidence in military systems had already been shaken in previous years.In 1987, a German teenager, Mathias Rust, flew a light aircraft through Soviet air defences and landed near Red Square. The incident had exposed weaknesses in radar coverage. Some officials remained sensitive about perceived vulnerabilities.
The alert is cancelled before retaliation
As tracking continued, Russian officers observed that the rocket was moving away from Russian airspace and posed no threat. The trajectory did not match that of a strike aimed at Moscow. The alert status was lowered. No missiles were launched. Later that day, Russian officials described the episode as a misunderstanding. Norwegian authorities confirmed that the launch was part of a scientific mission studying atmospheric conditions linked to the aurora.The incident lasted less than an hour. It did not become widely known until afterwards. Yet it remains one of the clearest examples of how miscommunication and automated warning systems can narrow decision time in nuclear states. A weather rocket, briefly, carried more weight than intended.
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