Is New Delhi recalibrating its approach to West Asia? The question has resurfaced after India’s notably cautious response to the latest escalation involving Iran. When the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28, triggering retaliatory missile attacks across the region, several global powers reacted swiftly. India, however, avoided taking a clear position on Tehran.In the crucial hours after the escalation, Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not directly comment on Iran. His first response came nearly a day later and focused instead on attacks on the United Arab Emirates. Subsequent conversations with leaders across the Gulf emphasised respect for their territorial integrity and the need for de-escalation, but again avoided directly naming Iran. Even after the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was confirmed, New Delhi stopped short of condemning the killing, offering only a condolence gesture days later.Experts describe this cautious approach as deliberate and calculated. “India’s policy has been very careful. Its interests are far more aligned with the US than Iran. That explains why it condoled and did not condemn Khamenei’s killing, even though it was a clear violation of international law,” said JNU professor Rajan Kumar. He noted that even though both India and Iran are BRICS members, New Delhi chose restraint over confrontation, highlighting the delicate balancing act in play.

How (When) India reacted on Iran war

28 Feb: US-Israel attack Iran

The United States and Israel launch strikes on Iran amid negotiations between Washington and Tehran over its nuclear programme.Iran retaliates with missile and air attacks across the region, targeting military sites in Israel as well as US bases in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Iraq.Prime Minister Narendra Modi makes over 15 posts on his social media X after the news of the war breaks out, but none of it on Iran situation.

March 1: Khamenei’s death confirmed

By midnight early March 1, the news that Iran Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is killed in the strikes gets confirmed.India, again, sees no reaction on breach of Iran’s sovereignty or the killing of its Supreme Leader Khamenei, even as its long-standing friend Russia is quick to condemn it in strong words, with President Vladimir Putin calling it a “cynical violation of law”.The first post by PM Modi comes on March 1, his 25th on his X account, at 11.26pm. The post condemns “attack” on the UAE. The Prime Minister was referring to Iran’s retaliatory strikes on US military bases in UAE, which had led to one death. However, he did not directly name Iran in his post.By midnight, PM Modi makes another post where he informs that he had a conversation with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he had two days before the war broke out. In the post, the PM again makes no mention of Iran, but calls for “early cessation of hostilities”.In a series of posts by the next day, PM Modi speaks to the leaders of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, condemning any violation of their territorial integrity. The PM was again referring to the strikes on US military bases in these nations by Iran in retaliation. India’s reaction to Khamenei’s death came five days after the incident. Foreign secretary Vikram Misri signed the “condolence” book in the Iranian embassy on behalf of the government. MEA dismissed this “delay” argument saying that the book was signed by India the first day it was opened, which was on March 5. However, MEA’s clarification failed to explain why the government itself took five days after the incident to formally convey its condolences.PM Modi’s reaction to Iran came only on March 12 when he spoke to Iranian president. The wording of the post was clear: “The safety and security of Indian nationals, along with the need for unhindered transit of goods and energy, remain India’s top priorities.” No condemnation or solidarity.

India did not condemn the death, neither did the PM or EAM make any direct comments on the killing. Then what explains this refusal to condemn the killing?Experts have termed it a “very cautious and very careful” move.“India’s policy has been very cautious and very careful. Its interests are much more aligned with US than Iran. Maybe that’s why it condoled and not condemned Khameinei’s death, while it was Khamenei’s death which was actually a violation of international law, said JNU professor Rajan Kumar, an international relations expert.“In fact, both Iran and India are members of Brics, still India chose not to condemn the attack,” he said.

Why historical Iran ties make current restraint notable

India’s historically close engagement with Iran makes this caution notable. The two countries share civilisational links stretching back centuries, which have shaped a modern partnership built on trade, culture and strategic cooperation. Diplomatic ties were formalised with a Friendship Treaty in 1950, and successive governments in New Delhi invested in maintaining strong political engagement with Tehran.Leaders from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were also central to strengthening these ties in the past. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Iran in 2001 led to the signing of the Tehran Declaration, marking a new phase of strategic cooperation. This was followed by Iranian President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami’s visit to India in 2003 and the New Delhi Declaration, which expanded political and economic engagement between the two countries.Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the relationship continued to see high-level outreach. Modi’s 2016 visit to Iran resulted in multiple agreements and the trilateral transit pact with Afghanistan centred on the development of Chabahar Port, a project seen as strategically important for India’s connectivity to Central Asia. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s visit to India in 2018 further reinforced cooperation in connectivity and trade.

So, what explains this shift away from Iran?

Analysts point to a mix of immediate security concerns and long-term economic dependencies that have pushed New Delhi to adopt a more cautious posture in the current West Asia crisis.A major factor is the safety of the large Indian diaspora across the Gulf. References to the Indian community appeared consistently in Prime Minister Modi’s statements on the unfolding conflict. There are over one crore Indians who work and live in Gulf nations, external affairs minister S Jaishankar informed the Parliament on Monday. This, he said, makes the West Asia war even more concerning for India. He informed that India has already lost two of its mariners, with one missing in the current situation. “We are committed to supporting the Indian community at this time,” Jaishankar said in the Parliament.Moreover, India is significantly dependent on Gulf supplies, especially in energy sector. The key economic concerns include:Oil: India exports nearly 40% of crude oil from Gulf. In 2025, it sourced around $70 billion crude oil and petroleum products from West Asia.LNG needs: The country is heavily dependent on West Asia for LNG requirements. It sourced liquefied natural gas or LNG worth $9.2 billion from West Asia, which is around 68.4% of its total LNG imports.LPG: LPG imports from West Asia were $13.9 billion in 2025, making up 46.9 % of India’s total LPG purchases. Cities such as Bengaluru, Mumbai and Chennai are seeing disruptions in commercial LPG supplies as authorities prioritise domestic cooking gas for households.

Recent closeness towards Israel

For decades after independence, India’s policy on Israel and Palestine was cautious. New Delhi supported the Palestinian cause and often voted with Arab countries in international forums, even voting against Israel’s admission to the United Nations. At the same time, India recognised Israel in 1950 and maintained limited contact while presenting itself as neutral. India later became the first non-Arab country to recognise the State of Palestine in 1988 and established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 after consultations with Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization.Relations with Israel began expanding gradually after the Cold War, particularly in defence and trade. However, earlier governments often kept the relationship relatively low-key to avoid upsetting Arab partners or appearing to move away from India’s traditional support for the Palestinian cause.A more visible shift came after Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014. Under his government, India’s ties with Israel grew more open and politically prominent. Defence cooperation increased and bilateral trade expanded, with both countries emphasising shared security concerns and technological cooperation.In 2017, PM Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel, marking a symbolic turning point in the relationship. During the trip, he was warmly received by Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and images of the two leaders walking together on Ogla beach became widely circulated, highlighting the new warmth in ties.

PM Modi’s 2017 Israel visit: PM with Israeli counterpart at Ogla beachThe closeness between the two governments has continued in recent years to a point where PM Modi was in Israel merely two days before Israel attacked Iran with the US.Referring to Israel as the “fatherland” and India as the “motherland”, PM Modi’s visit came at a time when Israel faced intense international criticism over its military campaign in Gaza, which has killed more than 60,000 Palestinians according to various estimates. “The timing of it was clearly wrong. The policy makers did not expect that to happen very soon. That sent a very wrong optics from a balanced policy perspective,” professor Rajan said.The war has also drawn renewed scrutiny of Netanyahu’s leadership, with critics and some international legal bodies describing him as responsible for alleged war crimes.The shift under PM Modi reflects both ideological and strategic factors. The Bharatiya Janata Party has long been seen as more openly supportive of Israel than previous governments. At the same time, India sees Israel as a key partner in defence technology, intelligence cooperation and innovation. As a result, India’s West Asia policy today attempts to balance closer ties with Israel while continuing to express support for Palestinian statehood.

PM Modi’s 2026 Israel visit: Netanyahu pointing out ‘saffron match’ between PM Modi and SaraHowever, professor Rajan said that India’s policy is not “completely determined by Israel”, rather, currently, it is more concerned about “offending” the US.“India’s policy is not completely determined by Israel. Yes, Israel is an important partner but in the past also we have pursued our ties with Israel without damaging our relations with other countries,” he said.“India is primarily concerned about offending the US. At this time, it would not like to offend the Trump administration. And that’s exactly why it is not issuing any statements condemning of killing of Khamenei,” he said.

So, is there a shift?

Rajan Kumar, a professor at JNU, who teaches international relations said that currently, there is no shift in India’s policy towards the Middle East. Rather, he said, that the shift might happen after the war is over.“At the moment, I don’t see any shift happening. It is a continuation of policy where India’s preferred partner was United States and Israel. But at the same time trade ties were linked with many other countries in the region,” he said.“So, a shift is not apparent at the moment, but it might happen after the outcome of the event. Because if India thinks that Iran remains an important part and if the regime survives, it will pursue a different strategy. But if US wins, which is very unlikely, if the regime survives, resistance persists, it will have a different strategy. Now, India is pursuing a wait-and-watch policy in West Asia,” he added.However, he added that there was a need for India to go for a policy of multipolarity, rather than unipolarity under the influence of Israel and the US.Experts argue that India should embrace multipolarity in West Asia, rather than a unipolar tilt toward Israel and the US. While Israel is a valuable partner, destabilizing relationships with other West Asian countries could jeopardize India’s economic and security interests in the region.“India should pursue multipolarity, rather unipolarity under the influence of Israel and US in West Asia. Although we have good ties with Israel, we cannot de-stabilise our ties with other West Asian countries, for the reason that our economic and security interests are aligned there,” he said.